State v. Johnson Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39573 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-26-2012
State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39573
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39573" (2012). Not Reported. 589.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/589
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE IDAHO, ) 
) 




NICHOLAS DAVID JOHNSON, ) APPELLANT'S 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE GREGORY CULET 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8576 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case .................................................................................. 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings . .. ... . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . ... .. .................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................. 7 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 8 
I. The District Court Erred When, Over His Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 403 Objection, It Admitted Four Autopsy 
Photographs Without Conducting The Balancing Test 
Required Under Rule 403 ................................................................... 8 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed 
A Unified Life Sentence, With Fifteen Years Fixed, 
Following Mr. Johnson's Conviction For Murder In The 
Second Degree .................................................................................. 10 
Ill. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, In Light Of 
The New Information Provided, It Denied Mr. Johnson's 
Rule 35 Motion .................................................................................. 14 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................ 16 
Cases 
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107 ( 1987) .................................................... 8 
State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392 (1991) .................................................................. 8 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396 (2000) ............................................................. 9 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997) ........................................................... 11 
State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................ 9 
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80 (Ct. App. 2011) ....................................................... 9 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982) .............................. .,., ............... 11 
State v. Trent. 125 Idaho 251 (Ct. App. 1994) .............................................. 14, 15 
Rules 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 .................................................................................. 8 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nicholas David Johnson appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder in the 
second degree following a jury trial. On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district 
court erred when it admitted, over his objection, several autopsy photographs without 
conducting the balancing test required under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. He also 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life 
sentence, with fifteen years fixed, and when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion in light of the new information provided in support thereof. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Johnson was charged with murder in the second degree for his role in the 
death of Jarmey Mccane. (R., pp.23-24.) The charge arose out of an incident that 
occurred in the early morning hours of June 25, 2011, following a "get-together" at the 
home of Bill and Stacy Kron. Among those present were the Krans, Ray and Stacy 
Lopez, Mr. Mccane (Stacy Lopez's brother), Mr. Johnson, and Paul Weremecki. 
Alcohol was being consumed, 1 and the evening consisted of everyone "[j]ust hanging 
out, talking, [and] visiting." Mr. Mccane came late to the get-together, and Ms. Kron 
1 With respect to the alcohol consumption, both sides stipulated to the following facts, 
which were read to the jury: 
Jarmey McCane's blood alcohol content on June 25th, 2011 at 2:12 a.m. 
was 0.18. Stacy Lopez's blood alcohol content on June 25, 2011 at 5:00 
a.m. was 0.13. Raymond Lopez's blood alcohol content on June 25, 2011 
at 5:56 a.m. was 0.11. Nicholas Johnson's blood alcohol content on 
June 25, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. was 0.069. 
(Tr., p.563, L.12 - p.564, L.1.) 
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could immediately "feel . . . tension" when he was introduced to Mr. Johnson. 
(Tr., p.271, L.16- p.283, L.14, p.439, L.8-p.443, L.25.) 
Mr. Weremecki testified that, during the course of the evening, he heard a 
commotion outside, and when he looked outside, he "saw Bill standing between Nick 
and Jarmey ... saying, 'Don't disrespect my house. Don't disrespect my friends that 
are here.' Kind of bumping the chest, like breaking them up kind of a deal." It looked to 
him like a fight was either about to happen or had just happened, and he saw Mr. Kron 
holding Mr. Johnson back and standing between him and Mr. Mccane. By the time that 
he left, he felt like "things kind of calmed down a little bit. The vibe kind of calmed 
down." When asked whether it seemed "like the defendant let it go," he responded, "It 
did. It seemed like everybody was pretty calm." At the time that he left, "it seemed like 
everybody was talking and getting along." (Tr., p.448, L.9 - p.452, L.18.) 
The get-together ended between 1 :45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. when Mr. Kron became 
concerned because, upon returning from relieving himself in his backyard, he heard his 
wife "say, 'My daughter's here. You guys, please have some respect."' Mr. Kron 
testified that, upon hearing his wife say this, and in light of the earlier incident (testified 
to by Mr. Werenecki), he decided that he was "done with the situation. I went to my 
room, I grabbed a bat, and I came back out, walked past everybody towards my sliding 
glass door, and told everybody the party - that it was over. It was time to go."2 
(Tr., p.467, L.24 - p.472, L.11.) Once the bat had been put away and everyone was 
outside in the street, Mr. Kron began apologizing, first to Mr. Lopez, then to Ms. Lopez, 
2 There is some dispute regarding whether Mr. Kron held the bat in the air when he 
ordered everyone out of his house, with Mr. Kron denying doing so (Tr., p.473, Ls.5-16), 
but his wife testifying that "he held it up and he said, 'Just go. Everybody just go."' 
(Tr., p.289, Ls.17-21.) 
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and finally to Mr. Mccane. Mr. Mccane then apologized to Mr. Kron "for disrespecting 
me at my - disrespecting my house." Mr. Kron estimated that this series of apologies 
went on for "approximately five to seven minutes." Mr. Kron did not know where 
Mr. Johnson was at that time, but he was not in the street with the rest of the group. 
(Tr., p.474, L.24-p.477, L.20; p.484, Ls.11-19.) 
Robert Deters, a medical examiner for Canyon County, testified concerning the 
Mr. McCane's cause of death, a single stab wound that "penetrated the right side of the 
chest and right lung, and as a result of that injury, this individual died." (Tr., p.409, L.15 
- p.413, L.25.) Dr. Deters also testified concerning several photographs that were 
taken during the autopsy. State's Exhibit No. 37 is a photograph of the wound. 
(Tr., p.415, L.19 - p.417, L.8; State's Exhibit No. 37.) State's Exhibit No. 38 is a 
photograph of the wound with a probe inserted to show trajectory, and depicts a portion 
of Mr. McCane's face, including his right ear and part of his chin. (Tr., p.419, L.19 -
p.420, L.18; State's Exhibit No. 38.) State's Exhibit No. 39 is "a photograph of the heart 
and right and left lungs, showing a fairly large stab wound on the lateral right upper 
lobe." (Tr., p.423, Ls.9-25; State's Exhibit No. 39.) State's Exhibit No. 40 is a 
photograph "of the right side of the chest with a probe in place." It also shows the inside 
of the rib cage and appears to show a large portion of the right side of Mr. McCane's 
chest without skin. (Tr., p.425, L.24 - p.426, L.18; State's Exhibit No. 40.) All four 
exhibits were admitted over Mr. Johnson's continuing Rule 403 objections. (Tr., p.415, 
L.19-p.426, L.18.) 
Mr. Johnson testified that, sometime after midnight, Mr. McCane apparently 
misinterpreted some of his sarcasm and felt disrespected by something he said; this 
appears to have been the incident described by Mr. Weremecki. As a result, 
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Mr. Johnson "apologized and shook his hand and told him I didn't mean any hard 
feelings towards you or anything like that." Sometime between 1 :45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., 
there was a "ruckus" and Mr. Johnson wasn't sure but felt like someone may have "felt 
disrespected." As a result, "all of a sudden I see Bill [Kron] come out with a baseball bat 
and usher us out the door." This caused Mr. Johnson to become "nervous" because, 
I didn't really understand the situation of the bat. I didn't think things were 
that bad. And the fact that a person that's intoxicated had a baseball bat 
kind of made me nervous. I let them proceed out the door before me, 
because I wanted to keep distance. And they proceeded out to the street, 
so I followed out to the porch. And they happened to be in front of my 
truck, so I kind of wanted to let the issue resolve itself before I attempted 
to go to my vehicle. 
(Tr. , p. 612, LA - p. 614, L. 11 . ) 
While the others were in the street and Mr. Kron was apologizing to them, 
IV1r. Johnson "heard someone say, like, This is because of an outsider, and I should kill 
him,' or somewhere (sic] along the lines of that." At that point, he "went back inside 
hoping that they would leave. And I grabbed a knife, because I could see the body 
language in these people, that they looked like they were going to approach me with a 
physical altercation." Mr. Johnson then returned to the front porch, put the knife in his 
pocket, and began smoking a cigarette while he waited for the area around his truck to 
clear. He explained that his intent in carrying the knife was "that if any sort of physical 
altercation - or altercation came towards me that I could just present the knife and just 
resolve that, and hopefully it wouldn't be a - kind of scare them away." 
Mr. Johnson then began sending text messages to his girlfriend, attempting to 
get her to pick him up. As he was putting his phone back in his pocket, "I got a glimpse 
of people moving towards me, advancing towards me on the porch." When he looked 
up, he saw Mr. Mccane "standing in the middle of the porch way ... [h]alfway between 
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the door and the far wall." Based on the significant differences in size between 
~Jlr. Mccane and Mr. Johnson (he is five feet, eight inches tall and weighs one hundred 
sixty pound, while Mr. Mccane "was about six-two, six-three, anywhere from 250 to 260 
[pounds]"), Mr. Johnson was concerned that Mr. Mccane could inflict serious bodily 
injury upon him, and felt that he was under severe threat from Mr. Mccane. 
f1M. l\t1cCane then "took a few steps toward me and I retreated back [to the wall at the far 
corner of the porch] and he swung." Mr. Johnson explained that, while retreating, "I 
started pulling the knife out of my pocket, hoping that he would see it ... I then was 
backed up in a defensive manner and put my hand up like this (indicating), as I seen 
[sic] a punch coming towards me. And I swung the knife with my head down." He 
explained that swinging the knife "was a reaction. I felt like I was being bombarded. It 
was just an instinct." (Tr., p.615, L.4 - p.624, L.14.) Mr. Johnson testified that he 
''[n]ever" had any intent to cause severe bodily harm to Mr. Mccane, and that when he 
used the knife, he was acting purely in self-defense. (Tr., p.634, Ls.11-18.) 
After stabbing Mr. McCane, Mr. Johnson noticed Ray Lopez coming at him, 
trying to grab him and take a swing at him. He was able to run to his truck, with 
Mr. Lopez "right behind me, grabbing me." He had to kick Mr. Lopez to get free of his 
grasp, and managed to pull the truck door shut. At that point, Mr. Lopez punched 
through the window, breaking it, and Mr. Johnson was able to lean out of the way of the 
punches before speeding away. (Tr., p.624, L.15 - p.625, L.11.) 
Once he had gotten safely away from the scene, Mr. Johnson went to his 
girlfriend's house, where he told her, "I was just in an altercation and I think I stabbed 
somebody." He then changed out of his bloody shirt and called 911 to report the 
stabbing. The 911 call ended up getting disconnected, and the 911 operator eventually 
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called him back. Mr. Johnson described himself as being "in shock and still hysterical 
about what had happened" when the 911 operator called back. When asked to give his 
name, he "got scared and locked up and gave them a false name."3 At that point, his 
girlfriend was driving him to his house, and they were pulled over by several police 
officers. (Tr., p.625, L.20 - p.628, L.24.) 
Following several jury questions, Mr. Johnson was found guilty of murder in the 
second degree. (R., pp.132-38.) At the sentencing hearing, the State requested the 
imposition of a unified sentence of forty-five to fifty years, with twenty years fixed. 
(Tr., p.800, L.23 - p.801, 14.) Defense counsel requested "a unified sentence of 10 to 
15 years with a fixed [term] not to exceed five to eight." (Tr., p.805, Ls.6-12.) 
Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen years fixed. 
(Tr., p.815, Ls.14-16.) 
Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from entry of the judgment of 
conviction. (R., p.149.) Mr. Johnson then filed a timely Rule 35 motion and requested a 
hearing on that motion. In support of his motion, Mr. Johnson provided new information, 
specifically that since his sentencing, "I am continuing [to pursue] my degree as well as 
several other programs and classes/' and that he had "not received any discipline 
actions and only continue to focus on the positive opportunities there are to better 
myself with the resources available." (R., p.169.) The district court denied the request 
for a hearing (R., p.179), and later denied the Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Rule 35 
Motion (augmentation).) 
3 The false name that Mr. Johnson provided was "George Hernandez." (State's Exhibit 
No. 1, 0:00 to 0:58.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1 Did the district court err when, over his Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 objection, it 
admitted four autopsy photographs without conducting the balancing test required 
under Rule 403? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, 
with fifteen years fixed, following Mr. Johnson's conviction for murder in the 
second degree? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the new information 




The District Court Erred When, Over His Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 Objection, It 
Admitted Four Autopsy Photographs Without Conducting The Balancing Test Required 
Under Rule 403 
Mr. Johnson objected, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, to the introduction of 
several autopsy photographs, primarily due the limited probative value that the 
photographs had given his stipulation to the cause and manner of death. The district 
court, without conducting the balancing test required under Rule 403, admitted four of 
the proposed exhibits. This failure to conduct the required balancing test amounts to 
error, and should result in the reversal of Mr. Johnson's conviction. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.RE. 403. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained Rule 403 as follows: 
The rule creates a balancing test. On one hand, the trial judge must 
measure the probative worth of the proffered evidence. The trial judge, in 
determining probative worth, focuses on the degree of relevancy and 
materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to 
be introduced. At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must 
consider whether the evidence amounts to unfair prejudice ... Only after 
using this balancing test, may a trial judge use his discretion to properly 
admit or exclude the proffered evidence. 
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110 (1987) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). This Court has upheld the admission of graphic photographs of a 
murder victim's body after a district court conducted the proper balancing test 
articulated in Davidson. See State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 407 (1991) ("The trial court 
balanced the unfair prejudicial value of the photographs with the relative probative value 
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and concluded that the four photographs allowed into evidence were less inflammatory 
than the other [six] photographs, and that they also clearly contained relevant evidence 
to a contested issue in the case."). 
In this case, the district court was faced with a Rule 403 objection to several of 
the State's proposed exhibits, photographs from an autopsy of Mr. Mccane, which were 
labeled State's Exhibit Nos. 36 to 40. (Tr., p.381, L.15 - p.393, L.1.) While the district 
court appears to have conducted the requisite balancing test in excluding one of the 
proposed exhibits (Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.10), specifically finding that the excluded 
exhibit "tends to be inflammatory, and there's no fact at issue that the photo, No. 36, 
establishes"4 (Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.10), it failed to do so with respect to the 
remaining four photographs. In reaching its decision to admit the remaining four 
photographs, the district court explained the standard to be employed, 
Let me first of all apply the standard. We're talking about, you know the -
there's a - this is ultimately a discretionary call on the court. First of all, I 
looked at is it relevant. Are there facts at issue in the case that these 
exhibits and photographs will assist the jury in deciding. And then are 
they outweighed by cumulative or prejudicial or inflammatory impact that 
might inflame the passions of the jury. 
(Tr., p.400, Ls.5-14.) 
The district court then cited to several appellate cases concerning the admission 
of photographs of murder victims. (Tr., p.400, L.15 - p.402, L.17 (citing State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396 (2000), State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80 (Ct. App. 2011), and 
State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 1989)). Recognizing "that there's a lot of facts 
in this case that are just not contested" including "who was present, the events that 
occurred, or the cause of death," the district court then explained, 
4 The State's proposed Exhibit No. 36 was described as "the face of the victim on the 
autopsy table." (Tr., p.398, Ls.14-15.) 
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But in this instance there is a factual issue before the court of not 
the cause of death, but the degree of culpability in the cause of death. 
And that's the, as I understand, the state's relevancy of this exhibit [sic], is 
to establish the degree of culpability. And I'm going to permit those 
exhibits to be admitted, and I'm going to make an admonition to the jury. 
The other exhibits that you have offered [other than 36], based on 
the issues before the court, are appropriate - are necessary, and I will 
advise the jurors about that, and they've been warned about this coming 
up. So I'll allow those to be - provided you continue to lay the foundation 
with your witness. 
All right. So I've ruled on those, got the arguments. And just noting 
for the record, just to recapitulate. It isn't - there is a factual issue that 
hasn't been stipulated to, and that is the factual issue of the degree of 
culpability in the crime. And that is reflected - or at least the state's 
position is that can be determined by the testimony - supported by the 
testimony of your witness. So that's an issue before the jury for them to 
consider and the witness to be cross examined on. 
(Tr., p.405, L.21 - p.407, L.7.) 
As can be seen from the district court's explanation for admitting State's Exhibit 
Nos. 37 through 40, it clearly considered the relevance of the exhibits, but never 
balanced the relevance of the exhibits against the potential for substantial prejudice as 
required under Rule 403. This failure amounts to error, and should result in 
Mr. Johnson's conviction being vacated, with the matter remanded to the district court 
for a new trial. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Life Sentence, With 
Fifteen Years Fixed, Following Mr. Johnson's Conviction For Murder In The Second 
Degree 
Mr. Johnson asserts that, in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his 
case, including his sincere expression of remorse and regret and his lack of any prior 
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felony convictions, the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive and amounts 
to an abuse of discretion. 
\/\/here a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Johnson does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Johnson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. These governing criteria are: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
Mr. Johnson has continuously expressed remorse and regret and accepted 
responsibility for his role in the death of Mr. Mccane. The night of his arrest, 
Mr. Johnson asked the police about Mr. McCane's condition, and "[w]hen notified 
Jarmey had died, Nicholas had tears in his eyes and said, 'It was fucked up, he had 
taken a life, and it was on his hands."' (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.4.) 
When asked to explain how he felt about his crime, Mr. Johnson wrote, 
Horrible. I went to an environment that I didn't expect any type of 
altercation and when things began to get hostile I should have made 
better decisions. I cannot believe that this actually happened. I could 
never be prepared for this Situation [sic] and handled it horribly. I never 
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intended to hurt anyone let alone take a life. I feel horrible for 
Mr. McCain's [sic] family and loved ones and wish I could go back and see 
things as clearly as I do now. It was a bad situation that led to a bad 
decision that resulted in the loss of a life that was never intended. It's a 
tragedy for all parties involved, even my family. I cannot express how 
truely [sic] sorry I am. 
(PSI, p.8 (quotation marks omitted).) He also explained that his crime "is something I 
have to live with every day." (PSI, p.8 (quotation marks omitted).) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Johnson again expressed remorse and regret while 
accepting responsibility, explaining, 
I would like to apologize to everyone here today. I am truly sorry for the 
mistake that I made that ended in absolute tragedy. I have spent the last 
six months in constant regret, wishing that I could go back and change 
things. Sadly, all I can do is tell you guys how truly sorry I am and hope 
that one day you can all forgive me. 
I am very sorry for my poor judgment, and I do feel the guilt of my actions, 
actions for which I acknowledge and take full responsibility for. Everything 
had happened so quickly, and I never expected this outcome. I may never 
fully know the pain that you are all feeling, but I do understand the 
damage that I have done. 
I have let down so many people that expected so much more of me, and I 
hurt people that I do not know. I never intended for any of this, and you all 
deserve better. Again, I am truly sorry. Thank you. 
(Tr., p.807, Ls.6-25.) The PSI writer noted, "Mr. Johnson did appear remorseful when I 
interviewed him." (PSI, p.22.) 
The events underlying this case had their genesis in alcohol use. As 
Mr. Johnson explained regarding his use of alcohol, it has "[p]roved to be a problem 
every time I used it." (PSI, p.21 (quotation marks omitted).) The PSI writer noted, "The 
defendant was intoxicated when he committed the present offense." (PSI, p.22.) With 
respect to his alcohol issue and the role it played in this offense, Mr. Johnson has 
expressed a desire to participate in alcohol treatment. (PSI, p.22.) 
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Mr. Johnson, who has six younger siblings, had a troubled and turbulent 
childhood. His parents divorced when he was twelve years old, due to his mother's use 
of illegal drugs. His father had abused alcohol until Mr. Johnson was about twelve 
years old. After the divorce, his mother continued to abuse illegal drugs, and 
Mr. Johnson "moved back and forth between his parents while growing up." When he 
was fourteen, he and one of his brothers moved to Missouri to live with their father. 
Upon returning to Idaho one year later, "he noted, 'My mother was using drugs even 
worse than before, the house was disgusting, and there was no food to eat. She had 
been trading our food stamps for meth."' Soon thereafter, Mr. Johnson's siblings were 
removed from their mother's home and placed into foster care. However, Mr. Johnson 
was not placed in foster care because ''[t]hey said I was too old and unwilling to go." 
His father returned to Idaho to deal with the situation, and eventually gained custody of 
Mr. Johnson's siblings. During that time, however, Mr. Johnson "dropped out of school 
and worked to help his father." His mother continued to abuse drugs, making no 
attempt to help her children. (PSI, p~.17-18.) 
Mr. Johnson enjoys the support of his family, reporting that "he shares a close 
bond with his brothers and sisters." (PSI, p.17.) Since his troubled childhood, his 
mother has gotten clean, begun going to school to become a nurse, and they have 
gotten close. He described his relationship with his father as "[a]mazing." One of 
Mr. Johnson's sisters, Denise, told the PSI writer, "Right now, we are actually really 
close, like best-friends close. He is a good person and cares for his family and adores 
his daughter." (PSI, p.18 (quotation marks omitted).) 
Several other mitigating factors are present in Mr. Johnson's case. First, this 
case represents Mr. Johnson's first and only felony conviction. (PSI, p.22.) Second, 
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"[a] representative of the Canyon County Sheriff's Office confirmed [that while in 
custody on this offense] the defendant received two minor infractions and noted he is, 
·overall, a pretty good inmate."' (PSI, p.17.) Third, Mr. Johnson has expressed a 
desire to engage in "self changing classes, drug/alcohol classes as well as mental 
health sessions," and has explained that he will do his "best to works [sic] towards 
redemption," and that any sentence he receives "will not just be a sentence for me but 
an opportunity to open my eyes to my faults and to rehabilitate myself to become an 
active member of society." (PSI, p.22.) Finally, Mr. Johnson, despite not having 
completed high school or obtained a 0.,5 began attending classes at Treasure 
Valley Community College shortly before the incident resulting in his conviction. (PSI, 
p.20.) 
In light of the mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. Johnson asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen 
years fixed, following his conviction for second degree murder. He asserts that the 
appropriate sentence for his offense is fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, In Light Of The New Information 
Provided. It Denied Mr. Johnson's Rule 35 Motion 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for 
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. 
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
5 Mr. Johnson has expressed a desire to earn a G.E.D. (PSI, p.20.) 
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the original sentence was reasonable." Id. If the sentence was not excessive when 
pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or 
additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. 
When new information has been presented in support of a Rule 35 motion, the 
appellate courts conduct "an independent review of the entire record available to the 
trial court at sentencing, focusing on the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender and the protection of the public interest." Id. When determining whether a 
sentence is excessive, the appellate courts "consider the entire length of the sentence 
under an abuse of discretion standard to determine its reasonableness." Id. 
Mr. Johnson provided new information in support of his Rule 35 motion, namely, 
thaC since his sentencing, "[d]uring my incarceration I am continuing my [Structural Fire 
Science] degree as well as several other programs and classes," and that he had "not 
received any discipline actions and only continue to focus on the positive opportunities 
there are to better myself with the resources available." (R., p.169.) 
Mr. Johnson asserts that when this new information is viewed together with the 
mitigating circumstances discussed in part II, supra, he has demonstrated that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. For the reasons 
set forth herein and in part II, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court order 
that his sentence be reduced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2012. 
S NCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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